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Following the collapse of the communist regime in 1990 and the legal guarantee of freedom of expression and freedom of the press, anti-Semitism immediately reappeared in Hungary. This phenomenon caused great alarm and heated debate. The cause of the alarm was the fear that the economic and social difficulties caused by the transition would make many people susceptible to anti-Semitic ideologies. Many people noticed that since the fall of the old system, processes had begun in the former communist countries whose consequences resembled the conflicts triggered by modernization in the 19th century. Not only had the former political system collapsed, but acquired statuses and associated identities had been shaken, the chances of social groups rising and falling had changed, familiar social rules and norms had lost their validity, and the previously predictable consequences of social action had often become unpredictable. In the 19th century, it was primarily these factors that led to the emergence of modern anti-Semitism in Europe, rather than the new forms of poverty that arose as a result of industrialization and urbanization. After the change of regime, the question was whether the transformations in Eastern Europe carried similar dangers. Should we fear that large groups in post-communist societies will express their problems caused by the great transformation in the undoubtedly and constantly present language of anti-Semitism, which will then be exploited by anti-Semitic forces?

Until the second half of the 2000s, literature on the Hungarian party system focused on the emergence of stability and the “freezing” of the party system (Enyedi 2006). This was no coincidence: ten years ago, the Hungarian party system appeared to be the most stable and least changeable system in the region, with clear and easily identifiable fault lines, permanent players, and low voter volatility. All this changed radically after 2006; the 2010 election can rightly be called a "political earthquake" or a "critical election" (Enyedi–Benoit 2011; Róbert–Papp 2012). The government that came to power in 2010 attempted to transform the entire political system—since then, Hungary has a new constitution, a new parliamentary law, and a new electoral system. However, the party system can only be influenced by two-thirds rules—but it can only be shaped by the actors jointly, in interaction with each other. Therefore, the extent to which the 2010 election was extraordinary in the Hungarian party system and marked the beginning of a new era only became clear in retrospect. In the summer of 2014, this question seems to have been decided: a new era began in the party system in 2010. This study analyzes the characteristics and defining features of this new era. Our study examines four questions in greater detail. First, we present the most important data describing the party system: we present the development and situation of the Hungarian party system in 2014. Next, we attempt to summarize the conceptual characteristics of the new party system.

This chapter examines the impact of gender, age, marital status, religion, denomination, region, social status, urbanization, and ideological orientations on party choice. We use educational attainment, subjective financial status, unemployment, and occupation to characterize social status. With regard to recent years, we also include vulnerability to foreign currency loans in the analysis. Ideological orientation is represented by three scales based on self-assessment. In our study, we also examine the relationship between these scales and present the changes that have taken place in the 2000s and the last two years. Based on international experience and knowledge of Hungary's recent past, it can be assumed that the sociological and ideological factors listed above play a role in shaping party preferences. Therefore, let us now briefly review Hungarian and international knowledge regarding each of these factors. As far as the political role of gender is concerned, it should first be noted that in countries with a two-party system in 21st-century democracies, women are more likely to vote for the left, while men generally tend to favor right-wing parties (Inglehart–Norris 2000). The male majority is particularly characteristic of radical right-wing parties, while Christian Democratic parties, despite their right-wing profile, often receive more support from women than from men. The masculine character of right-wing parties is reinforced when they take a stand on abortion.

It is an interesting contradiction that while political discourse tends to attribute the occasional rise of the far right to a single cause (i.e., economic crises), social science literature seems to offer too many different explanations. It is quite difficult to systematize the various theories, partly for quantitative and partly for content-related reasons. Although research into right-wing extremism does not fundamentally differ from the study of other political trends and actors, the relationship with the far right is considered a particularly sensitive area even within the world of politics. The emergence of a new theory is therefore not only of scientific interest, but also of significant political relevance, and the search for explanations regularly becomes an important topic of public debate. Since the early 1980s, when the third wave of far-right parties began to gain ground in Europe after World War II, there has been a great deal of interest in the subject, and a significant number of academic publications have appeared, many of which are based on extensive international empirical research. A characteristic feature of the study of this phenomenon is that, amid the publication of numerous articles and studies, references to the work of a few authors have become almost inevitable in political science literature. Although the various theories reflect each other to a certain extent, there is still no consensus on the driving forces behind the far right.

Although daily or even quarterly economic data contain alternating good and bad news, it is hardly debatable that Hungary's long-term economic trends are very unfavorable. In terms of competitiveness, growth, investment, productivity, employment, and many other indicators, it is almost impossible to choose a base period in the two and a half decades since the change of regime that would not make us sad when we look at the situation today. This is especially true when we consider the expectations expressed by the majority of the population and experts at the time of the change of regime, upon joining the European Union, or in response to the promises made by successive governments. Many people from many sides have analyzed the reasons for this, and many high-quality and—sometimes leaning one way, sometimes the other—apologetic writings have been produced. Nevertheless, I believe that it is still worthwhile to expand the analysis with a few new perspectives, because the rhetoric and practices of the coalition government that came to power in 2010 contain a number of new elements. Not only do we hear from leading politicians and professional leaders that the path taken so far and the political and economic thinking behind it have led to a dead end (which is more or less standard rhetoric for a newly elected government), but also that it was/is not only the path that was/is the problem, but the orientation itself: the Western European democratic market economy, in which we (along with our current leaders) had such great faith a quarter of a century ago.

Recently, on July 28, 2014, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán gave a speech in Tusnádfürdő entitled "The Era of the Work-Based Society is Coming."2 The speech caused quite a stir both in Hungary and abroad. I will focus on just a few sentences from his wide-ranging discussion. "...there is a race to find the form of community organization, the form of government that is best able to make a nation, a community, internationally competitive. This explains why... the hot topic in thinking today is understanding systems that are not Western, not liberal, not liberal democracies, perhaps not even democracies, and yet make nations successful. Today, the stars of international analysis are Singapore, China, India, Russia, and Turkey. It is a peculiar list. What are the characteristics that can be found in all of the countries mentioned, but not in other countries that cannot be considered stars? Let us look at Table 1. Four of the five countries had high GDP growth rates for a long time, even during and immediately after the crisis, much higher than in many "declining" Western countries and Hungary. In the eyes of many, this would justify the "star" rating. However, Russia stands out from the crowd, where the average GDP growth rate in the period 2009-2013 was no higher than that of the United States. As for the other characteristic mentioned in the speech, India is considered an odd one out.

During Berlusconi's populist rampage, I repeatedly tried to find out from my Italian acquaintances what was fueling the Cavaliere's popularity. At least to see more clearly. If the people cannot be replaced even when the members of the politburo would gladly choose someone else. This phenomenon was also known in antiquity, when the mood of the free Athenians and Romans fluctuated greatly. What they approved of yesterday, they rejected today. Democracy was constantly replaced by dictatorship. But if someone is a believer in the principle of popular sovereignty, how can they not respect the will of the people? Whether they understand their motivation is another question. Whether they approve of the decision is another question. And if they don't approve, what should they do? That's another question for the evening. I think I understand the factors behind Putin's popularity, who pursues Greater Russian interests with the tools of the secret service. At the time, I also thought I understood Slobodan Miloševiċ's popularity. In some cases, an overwhelming majority will elect a slick, sickeningly deceitful scoundrel. And then democratic elections, in themselves, may not be the only sufficient condition for democracy after all. When examining the origins of the local or even global populist turn and what lessons it holds for democracy, a believer in popular sovereignty cannot avoid this question. Once the majority of voters have had enough of the chaos caused by the many petty thieving oligarchs, the corruption that is grinding down the state machinery and draining the state coffers, and would rather have a dictator, a strong man...

Who are the poor, and what should society do about poverty? This has been a controversial topic for centuries, but it shows no signs of going away. If we are to believe Károly Polányi, the "poor laws" in England, which date back to the 14th century, treated the poor in the same way as criminals and the mentally ill, locking them up in prison-like poorhouses until the middle to end of the 19th century, where they were forced to perform hard labor. The underlying philosophy behind poorhouses was that the poor were lazy scoundrels who needed to be punished and put to work by society. Even today's political and public thinking is not entirely free from this view of poverty. Following the American conservative thinker Charles Murray, who is otherwise very intelligent and raises many important questions, it is still fashionable today to distinguish between the poor who are "worthy of support" and those who are "unworthy of support." Some people quote the biblical verdict: "If anyone is not willing to work, let him not eat" (2 Thessalonians 3:10). The main message of my study is that poverty is a large extended family, a cancerous disease, each type of which requires a different treatment. The developers of the so-called unconditional basic income (UBI) in Hungary deserve praise for finally formulating a consistently left-wing program to address this problem. Perhaps everyone, from neoconservatives to neoliberals, agrees that poverty stems from a lack of resources (insufficient income).

Hungary changed its system a quarter of a century ago. That is usually enough time for a social system to prove itself: after 25 years, Germany had long since consolidated its democracy, and Finland and South Korea had achieved their goal of catching up economically. Our country, however, was further behind Austria in 2010 than it was in 1990. At some point in the middle of the 18th century, our lag behind our neighbor, which has always been the West to catch up with, was comparable to what it is today. 1 Despite all our significant political and economic achievements, we are being overtaken one by one by our former regional peers, Slovakia, Poland, and others. Only Romania and Bulgaria are now behind our country, which in 1989 was still considered a leading reformer in the European Union. 2 For almost forty years now, since 1973, Hungary has not experienced a decade of growth that has reached the broadest groups of people and maintained economic balance; rather, it has been characterized by recurring crises. Perhaps the best period was between the summer of 1997 and 2001. Otherwise, cycles of austerity following budgetary overspending and market-oriented reforms followed one another. Economic problems that repolarized society and created a series of hopelessly disadvantaged groups burdened the fledgling democracy with a flood of discontent from the outset. The increasingly extreme public opposition made the competition between the parliamentary coalition governments increasingly damaging.