Series

What is missing for the uneducated population of the former socialist countries to find work at the level established in Europe (or even Latin America)? This is probably the most important unanswered question of domestic and Eastern European labor market research. The lagging behind of the post-socialist countries in this area is so extensive and so region-specific that it is not helped by referring to either global trends (‘skill-biased technological change’) or sharply different institutional characteristics between the countries of the region (minimum wage, benefit systems, employment policy). Neither the data on the size of the uneducated population and – hence its average expected abilities – nor the data on relative wages or relative cognitive skill levels predict a common, regional labor market failure. According to the 2008 data from the European Labour Force Surveys (EU-LFS), the observed East-West difference in the employment rate of the unskilled was 24.5 percentage points, much larger than the intra-regional standard deviations (8.9 percentage points in the former socialist countries and 9.5 in the western EU countries). A country-level regression with an Eastern Europe dummy as the only explanatory variable explains 61% of the total variance in employment rates. A similar univariate employment logit model estimated on individual data correctly classifies 72.7% of men and 54.4% of women, and 59.4% of all observations. The absolute and relative employment rates of the uneducated population are only higher in Romania and Slovenia than in Belgium, which lags far behind the western EU countries. All other former socialist countries perform worse than any western EU member state. The employment rate of the unskilled compared to the skilled does not reach 45% in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia and Hungary, 40% in the Czech Republic and Poland, and 35% in Lithuania and Slovakia.

The unfavorable social and economic situation of the Roma population in Hungary and their resulting marginalization are frequent topics of public discourse, but the discussion often lacks data. In this study, we attempt to compile the latest indicators of the situation of the Roma in the areas of education, employment, housing, and health. 2 The importance of this topic is beyond question: according to estimates, the Roma population, which accounts for approximately 6-7% of the country's population, is the poorest, most excluded, and thus the most vulnerable group in society. The gap between the Roma and the majority society has been widening steadily since the change of regime, mainly due to the segregation of the Roma in terms of where they live and their separation in other areas of society, particularly in education. In addition, the position of Roma in schools and the labor market remains weak, leading to the persistence and deepening of poverty. This is often coupled with a negative, often hostile atmosphere surrounding Roma, which manifests itself in prejudice and discrimination from the majority of mainstream society, compounded by the fact that Roma have become the target of far-right movements in the past decade (Bernát–Juhász–Krekó–Molnár 2012). Despite civil society and government efforts in the area of Roma integration, these programs have not improved the overall picture.

This study is the first in the literature to report on the secondary school careers and university opportunities of Roma students in Hungary based on a nationally representative sample representing an entire secondary school cohort. We focus on the critical issue of obtaining a secondary school diploma. Just as one of the most significant achievements of Hungarian society after the change of regime was the widespread expansion of secondary schools offering the school-leaving certificate, and with it the widespread democratization of pathways to university, so too are the disadvantages of disadvantaged groups most acutely evident in terms of secondary school dropout rates. This is the fault line where today's Hungarian society is divided into young people who have access to knowledge and the opportunity to live a dignified life, and those who are deprived of the opportunity to acquire knowledge and are therefore condemned to permanent poverty and social exclusion. Young people in Hungary today who are unable to obtain some form of secondary school qualification must prepare themselves for long-term unemployment or irregular employment.1 One in two Roma young people aged 20 today find themselves in this situation. With such prospects, it is very difficult to develop a lifestyle that allows them to integrate into society. The other major issue is obtaining a high school diploma and continuing on to university. While in the years following the change of regime, 20-year-old Roma youth had virtually no chance of obtaining a high school diploma, today one in five has a high school diploma.

The economic crisis that unfolded in 2009 adversely affected the income situation and livelihood of young adults’ households through several channels. The increase in unemployment reduced the labor income of households, which particularly affected young people in Hungary and other EU countries (Gáti et al. 2012). In addition to the decrease in labor income, the livelihood difficulties of young people were also exacerbated by the fact that crisis management measures also reduced household incomes from state transfers (family support, social assistance) (Tóth–Medgyesi 2011). In our study, we examine how the living conditions and income situation of young adults developed during the economic crisis in Hungary, in comparison with other EU member states. During the economic crisis, the unemployment rate among young people increased significantly. The unemployment rate for 15–24 year olds increased from 16% in the year before the crisis to 23% in 2012 on average in the EU countries (EC 2013). In Hungary, the labour market situation of young people was even worse than the EU average, e.g. the unemployment rate for 15–24 year olds was 20% in 2008, which increased to 28% in 2012. The increase in the unemployment rate among young people was greater than among the total working age population, which in Hungary, similarly to the EU average, increased by 3 percentage points between 2008 and 2012 (from 8% to 11%). In post-industrial societies, due to prolonged schooling, high unemployment among young people, and the postponement of family formation, the independence of young people is increasingly postponed. More and more young people remain dependent on their parents in certain aspects even after reaching adulthood. This so-called “post-adolescence” stage of life is wedged between youth and adulthood, and represents a more or less prolonged transition between the two life stages (Vaskovics 2000).

The economic and economic policy assessment of household savings is characterized by a peculiar duality. On the one hand, household savings play a prominent role in financing investments and maintaining the external financial balance of national economies. At the same time, household consumption has a decisive influence on GDP growth in every country, as it is the largest component of GDP on the expenditure side. And since household savings are the portion of disposable income remaining after consumption expenditure, higher consumption means lower savings. In other words, high household financial savings from a given income result in lower consumption (GDP) but better financial balance, while low savings result in higher consumption but greater external financial vulnerability. Economic policies try to balance these dilemmas – as we will see in our study – with relatively little success. The 2008 international financial crisis caused a severe financial shock and imbalance in the world that continues to this day. The negative effects of the crisis on public debt and the options for dealing with them occupy a large space in the literature and are also at the center of US and European economic policy. Relatively less attention has been paid to the savings behavior of households before the crisis and its financial and real economic consequences after the crisis. 

Until the mid-2000s, with two exceptions, research into Hungarians working abroad or leaving the country was virtually non-existent in Hungarian migration literature. The analysis of migration abroad was based on only two indirect (migration potential and remittances) and two direct, but highly unreliable macrostatistical sources: the mirror statistics of national statistical offices and Eurostat, and the official statistics of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (KSH) based on emigration data.

If we have a good thermometer, it can be very helpful in telling us how cold it is outside. However, it is less useful to use a thermometer to find out why it is cold. In 2009, it became clear that we have a good thermometer and that, based on it, it is indeed quite cold outside. We tried to understand why it might be cold through scientific2 and public3 debates that unfolded in connection with our research. In 2013, we had the opportunity to measure the outside temperature again using the same thermometer. We found that the outside temperature had not changed much, but if it had, the weather had become slightly more pleasant. This time, however, we were not satisfied with the average temperature. We were also curious to see how it had changed. Surprisingly, we found that where the weather was more pleasant in 2009, it had become less so in 2013. In the cooler areas, we measured slightly warmer temperatures. Since we placed our thermometer in the same place on both occasions, we had the impression for a moment that perhaps a different sun was shining four years ago than it is now. Whatever the case, it is certain that such temperature fluctuations can have harmful effects on health, especially when we add that, despite the improving indicators, it is basically cold.

In this study, I explore the issues of national identity, attitudes toward immigrants, and perceptions of social conflict. Among other things, the study seeks to answer how the national attachment and European identity of Hungarians and other nations living in the region changed during the two decades between 1992 and 2014, a period that coincided with the most intensive phase of European Union enlargement. Time series data also provide answers to the question of whether the degree of rejection towards immigrants and other minorities changed during the period when the free movement of labor within EU countries was first restricted and then fully implemented. Where possible, I also analyze attitudes in an international comparison. The relevance of the study in the case of Hungary is given by the political, public, and ethnic conflicts that have intensified since the turn of the millennium: to what extent do Hungarians perceive conflicts between different social groups at the end of the period under review? Numerous empirical studies on the topic of national identity were conducted both before and after the change of regime (see, for example, Csepeli 1985, 1992; Csepeli–Örkény 1998). The results obtained from the 1995 International Social Survey Program (ISSP) showed that national feelings and various identity elements—such as being born in Hungary, Hungarian citizenship, Christianity, language, and self-classification—have different but practically unchanged weight.

Much of the economic research conducted in the late 19th and early 20th centuries focused on cycle theory. Just as in other areas of life, there is a life cycle model in economics and society in which new things are born, experience a renaissance, and then disappear, which has an impact on the entire economy. In this study, we seek to answer the question of whether cycles of varying lengths can be found in the Hungarian economy and society that repeat themselves from time to time, and if so, what influences the movement of these cycles.

The final question of our study is: has the demand for redistribution changed during the crisis in the countries of the European Union and in Hungary, and if so, how? Was the demand for redistribution influenced by the severity of the crisis in each country, or by whether they managed to recover from the economic downturn, and if so, how quickly? In order to attempt an explanation, we first examine the determinants of demand for redistribution and attitudes toward the extensive benefits provided by the welfare state in an international comparison, and then move on to analyze trends in Hungary. In our study, we first present the data and research questions (Chapter 2). We then present an international comparative analysis based on data from 2009 and 2014 (Chapter 3), assuming that there are country-specific determinants of demand for state redistribution and that there are factors that determine individuals' demand for redistribution in general, regardless of the macro (country-level) characteristics of each country. To identify the latter factors, we perform regression analyses and attempt to estimate respondents' attitudes toward welfare redistribution based on their individual characteristics. Following the international comparative analysis, in Chapter 4 of the study we examine the trends that can be observed in Hungary in terms of demand for redistribution and the extensive provision of welfare state benefits.